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COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
FUTURE POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DIRECTIONS
GABRIEL J. CHIN*
National policy with respect to collateral consequences is receiving more
attention than it has in decades. This article outlines and explains some of the
reasons for the new focus. The legal system is beginning to recognize that for
many people convicted of crime, the greatest effect is not imprisonment, but
being marked as a criminal and subjected to legal disabilities. Consequences
can include loss of civil rights, loss of public benefits, and ineligibility for
employment, licenses, and permits. The United States, the 50 states, and their
agencies and subdivisions impose collateral consequences—often applicable
for life—based on convictions from any jurisdiction. However, because they
were deemed “civil,” collateral consequences have been created and imposed
with few constitutional limitations.
In recent years, the American Law Institute, American Bar Association, and
Uniform Law Commission all have proposed reforms, which are now being
seriously considered in a number of jurisdictions. Meanwhile, scholars have
advanced, and courts have sometimes accepted, an argument that they
previously rejected, namely that collateral consequences can be of
constitutional magnitude. As courts take collateral consequences more
* Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law;
founding board member, Collateral Consequences Resource Center (http://ccresourcecenter.org/
[https://perma.cc/4TMY-AJMZ]); Reporter, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (2004),
and UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2010). Thanks to Margy Love for
comments, to the editors of the Marquette Law Review for expert editing, and to Dean Joseph Kearney
and the faculty of the Marquette Law School for the opportunity to present a version of this paper as
the Barrock Lecture. It draws on Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences, in 4 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 371 (Erik Luna ed., 2017),
http://academyforjustice.org/volume4/ [https://perma.cc/9EVM-834T] [hereinafter 4 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675 (2011) [hereinafter Chin, Making Padilla Practical];
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012) [hereinafter Chin, The New Civil Death]; and Gabriel J. Chin, Taking Plea
Bargaining Seriously: Reforming Pre-Sentence Reports after Padilla v. Kentucky, 31 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 61 (2011).
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seriously, legislatures have begun to reduce the numbers of collateral
consequences and provide legal mechanisms for the relief of those that remain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After decades of obscurity, collateral consequences seem to be moving into
the spotlight of the United States legal system.1 Everyone knows that a
conviction may result in imprisonment, fine, probation, or parole. Until

1. The mainstreaming of collateral consequences may be symbolized by the fact that John Oliver
dedicated the November 8, 2015, episode of his HBO show Last Week Tonight to the issue of prisoner
reentry and addressed a number of collateral consequences. LastWeekTonight, Prisoner Re-entry: Last
Week
Tonight
with
John
Oliver
(HBO),
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
8,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJtYRxH5G2k [https://perma.cc/J4SL-FVNQ].
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relatively recently, even among lawyers, few understood that people with
criminal convictions face a network of additional legal effects, known as
This was unfortunate, because collateral
collateral consequences.2
consequences affect many areas of life, often more significantly than traditional
forms of punishment. Some criminal convictions can lead to loss of civil status;
a citizen may lose the right to vote, serve on a jury, or hold office; a non-citizen
may be deported or become ineligible to naturalize.3 A conviction may make a
person ineligible for public benefits, such as the ability to live in public housing
RU KROG D GULYHU¶V OLFHQVH4 Criminal convictions affect employment; laws
prohibit hiring of people with convictions as peace officers or as employees for
the health-care industry.5 A criminal conviction can also make a person
ineligible for a license or permit necessary to be employed or to do business; it
can cause the forfeiture of a pension.6 Criminal convictions can also affect
family relations, such as the ability to have custody of or visitation with RQH¶V
child.7 While criminal convictions have serious nonlegal effects, such as stigma
or shame, the focus of this article is on legal mandates.8
In the last half of the twentieth century, courts invalidated few, if any,
collateral consequences, ruling that they were civil regulatory measures which
were tested against deferential standards of review associated with other
economic regulations and were not subject to the restraints imposed by the Bill
of Rights on criminal punishment.9 However, starting in the new millennium,
courts and important actors began to notice collateral consequences and think
about how they can be integrated into the legal system. In 2004, the American
Bar Association (ABA) promulgated ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:
Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons.10
2. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1103±04
(2013).
3. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1800.
4. Id. at 1801, 1827; see also Gwen Rubenstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing–
Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, at 43±44 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
5. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1800; see also DiCola v. FDA, 77 F.3d 504, 507
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
6. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1801.
7. Id. at 1800.
8. ThLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDW³LQIRUPDO´FROODWHUDOFRQVHTXHQFHVDUHXQLPSRUWDQW See Logan, supra
note 2, at 1104±05.
9. State v. Meadows, No. A13±1023, 2014 WL 3396238, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 14, 2014).
10. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (AM. BAR ASS¶N 2004) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARD].
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The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) promulgated the Uniform Collateral
Consequences of Conviction Act in 2009, and the American Law Institute
(ALI) amended the Model Penal Code sentencing provisions to address
collateral consequences in 2017.11 As a result, jurisdictions imposing collateral
consequences have a wealth of carefully considered policy recommendations
and statutory models to improve their laws.
The courts have also been active. In 2010, the Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,12 overruling scores of lower court
cases to hold that counsel had an obligation to advise noncitizen clients about
the possibility of deportation following a conviction.13 More recently (in 2017),
the Court, per Justice Anthony Kennedy, offered a broader suggestion of doubt
about the network of collateral consequences. In the course of an opinion
invalidating a prohibition on sex offenders accessing the internet, the Court
VWDWHG ³2I LPSRUWDQFH WKH WURXEOLQJ IDFW WKDW WKH ODZ LPSRVHV VHYHUH
restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer
subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system is also not an issue
EHIRUHWKH&RXUW´14 Similarly, state courts and lower federal courts have found
that particular collateral consequences violate state and federal constitutional
guarantees.15 State legislatures have also responded, with many of them
increasing access to relief methods or otherwise relieving collateral
consequences.16
Part II of this article outlines the policy problem of collateral consequences
in a nation with tens of millions of members with criminal records. Part III
describes the reforms proposed by the ABA, ULC, and ALI. Part IV proposes
that a steady stream of court decisions have been chipping away at the
functional immunity collateral consequences previously enjoyed. In addition,
scholars have developed arguments that the federal Constitution or the
11. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (amended 2010) (NAT¶L
CONFERENCE
OF
COMM¶RS
ON
UNIF.
STATE
LAWS
2011),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DT68-KA5N] [hereinafter UCCCA]; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6x (AM.
LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, approved 2017).
12. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
13. Id. at 374.
14. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737±38 (2017).
15. Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 2016); Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1223 (Pa.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018).
16. See COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., FOUR YEARS OF SECOND CHANCE REFORMS,
2013±2016: RESTORATION OF RIGHTS & RELIEF FROM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1 (2017),
http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/4-YEARS-OF-SECOND-CHANCEREFORMS-CCRC.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4ZS-WBWN].

2018]

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

237

constitutions of the states require more searching review, portending a
continuing flow of legal challenges.
The article concludes by predicting that the combination of institutional
support for policy change, along with the threat of imposition by constitutional
law, will speed the process of reform and bring collateral consequences into the
criminal justice system for purposes. Instead of being invisible, collateral
consequences will be consciously limited to those that are necessary, will be
SDUW RI GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V duties with respect to plea bargaining and client
counselling, and will be taken into account at sentencing.
II. THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Mass Conviction
The United States is in an era of mass conviction. Many distinguished
commentators XVHD GLIIHUHQWWHUP ³PDVV LQFDUFHUDWLRQ´17 Since 1970, and
even more profoundly since 1980, the increase in the rate of imprisonment and
WKHDEVROXWHQXPEHURISHRSOHLQSULVRQKDVEHHQFDOOHG³XQSUHFHGHQWHGLQWKH
KLVWRU\RIOLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\´18 In 1980, more than 500,000 Americans were
confined to prisons and jails; in 2015, there were over 2.1 million.19

17. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2010); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); Todd R. Clear & James
Austin, Mass Incarceration, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note *, at 55; MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN
AMERICA (2006); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION (2007); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the
Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477 (2009); Ian F. Haney López, PostRacial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1023 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004); Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions:
Housing, Homicide, and Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 165; Anthony C.
Thompson, Unlocking Democracy: Examining the Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration on
Black Political Power, 54 HOW. L.J. 587 (2011); James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass
Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, LET¶S GET FREE: A HIPHOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009)).
18. Jude McCulloch & Phil Scraton, The Violence of Incarceration: An Introduction, in THE
VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 1, 14 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009).
19. DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250374,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 2 tbl.1 (2016); see also ALLEN J. BECK
& DARRELL K. GILLIARD, U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 151654, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 2 (1995).
OF
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<HWWKHIRFXVRQ³PDVVLQFDUFHUDWLRQ´20 obscures the reality that prison is
not the default tool of the criminal justice system. There are approximately one
million new state felony convictions in a typical year21 and many more
misdemeanor convictions.22 In addition, there are approximately 80,000 federal
convictions annually.23 Most defendants convicted of felonies are not
sentenced to state prison²about 60% receive probation only or probation with
jail.24 Even more misdemeanor convictions do not result in incarceration.25
While sentence length has increased, the average term is less than five years.26
Accordingly, it is likely that the vast majority of even those convicted of
felonies and sentenced to prison will spend most of their lives in free society.

20. :KLOH WKH SKUDVH ³PDVV LQFDUFHUDWLRQ´ GRHV QRW FDSWXUH WKH IXOO LPSDFW RI FROODWHUDO
consequences, this observation is not meant to imply that scholars using the phrase are unaware of the
collateral consequences of criminal conviction, or have not paid enough attention to them in their
scholarship. The observation is about the limits of the term, not about the work of those who use it.
21. E.g., SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006²STATISTICAL TABLES 1 tbl.1 (2009).
22. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2015, at 16 (2016)
(reporting 1.158 million arrests in California in 2015, of which 314,748 were for felonies and the
remainder for misdemeanors or status offenses); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK
OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012) (reporting that
misdemeanors comprised a majority of the criminal caseload in a 2010 study of seventeen states);
LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228538, PUBLIC DEFENDER
OFFICES, 2007²STATISTICAL TABLES 12 tbl.5a (2010) (reporting that public defenders surveyed were
assigned a total of 378,400 felony and 575,770 misdemeanor cases in 2007); Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 n.25 (2012) (estimating 10.5 million nontraffic
misdemeanors annually (citing NAT¶ L ASS¶N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA¶S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11
(2009))). See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION
AND
CRIMINALIZATION
71
(Erik
Luna
ed.,
2017),
http://academyforjustice.org/volume1/ [https://perma.cc/PMJ3-N95K]. Systematic misdemeanor
statistics are not readily available, but it is clear that misdemeanor convictions are more common than
felony convictions.
23. See U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231822, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008²STATISTICAL
TABLES tbl.5.1 (2010) (reporting 82,823 federal convictions in the year ending September 30, 2008, of
which 75,832 were felonies).
24. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 21, at 4 tbl.1.2.
25. Natapoff, supra note 22, at 82±84. However, even those not incarcerated can be caught up
in the system because of the obligation to pay fines, costs, and assessments. See generally ALEXES
HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016);
Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175,
1176±77, 1185 (2014).
26. State prison sentences averaged fifty-nine months. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 21, at
6 tbl.1.3. Federal sentences averaged just over five years. U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at
tbl.5.2.
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Those convicted but not incarcerated are typically on probation or parole.27
About 7 million people were on probation or parole at some point during
2015,28 more than three times the number in prison or jail.29 At the broadest
level, approximately 75 million adults have a criminal record, although some
records involve arrests not leading to conviction.30 Accordingly, the size of the
offender population is not just the 2 million in custody; it also includes the more
than 7 million in the control of the criminal justice system who are not in
custody, plus the tens of millions with a record.
Not being incarcerated does not mean that a person with a conviction has
escaped legal consequences.31 ,QWKHZRUGVRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW³>D@IHORQ
FXVWRPDULO\VXIIHUVWKHORVVRIVXEVWDQWLDOULJKWV´32 Every conviction implies a
permanent change, because these disabilitLHVZLOO³FDUU\WKURXJKOLIH´33 For

27. See generally Michael Tonry, Community Punishments, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note *, at 187.
28. DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 3 tbl.1, 4 fig.4, 5 fig.5 (2017). This figure includes 4.71
million on probation or parole at year-end 2014, plus 1.9 million probation entries, and 475,200 parole
entries. Id.
29. See id.; see also KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 19.
30. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT¶L EMP¶T LAW PROJECT, WANTED:
ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT    QRWLQJWKDWWKH)%,³PDLQWDLQV
FULPLQDO KLVWRU\ UHFRUGV RQ PRUH WKDQ  PLOOLRQ LQGLYLGXDOV´  see also MICHELLE NATIVIDAD
RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT¶L EMP¶T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION ³1EED NOT APPLY´
THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 27 n.2 (2011).
31. See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2016); JEFF
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 71 (2006); CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (Christopher Mele & Theresa A.
Miller eds., 2005); NAT¶L ASS¶N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA¶S
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME, A ROADMAP TO RESTORE RIGHTS AND
STATUS AFTER ARREST OR CONVICTION 12, 22 (2014); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK:
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005). See also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 4; Nora V. Demleitner,
Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11
STAN. L. & POL¶Y REV. 153, 154 (1999).
32. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946); see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S.
   ³6WDWHV LPSRVH D ZLGH UDQJH RI GLVDELOLWLHV RQ WKRVH ZKR KDYH EHHQ FRQYLFWHG RI
FULPHVHYHQDIWHUWKHLUUHOHDVH´ 
33. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946); see also Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574,
593±94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ³&RQYLFWLRQ RI D IHORQ\ LPSRVHV D status upon a person
which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but
which also VHULRXVO\DIIHFWVKLVUHSXWDWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFRSSRUWXQLWLHV´ .
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citizens, a prominent collateral consequence is the loss of civil rights:34 ³$
convicted criminal may be disenfranchised, . . . lose the right to hold federal or
state office, . . . be barred from entering certain professions, . . . be subject to
impeachment when testifying as a witness, . . . be disqualified from serving as
D MXURU´35 and lose the right to keep and bear arms.36 For non-citizens,
conviction may result in deportation.37
Collateral consequences are sometimes triggered by specific offenses;38
RWKHUVDSSO\WR³IHORQLHV´RUYDJXHFDWHJRULHVOLNHFULPHVRIPRUDOWXUSLWXGH39
Some apply automatically, while others authorize a regulator to act on a caseby-case basis.40 Some apply for a specified term, others apply for life.41
The effects of the loss of status are particularly profound given the many
areas of life now subject to governmental regulation. Conviction potentially
affects many aspects of family relations, including, for example, the ability to
adopt, be a foster parent, or retain custody of children.42 Conviction can make
one ineligible for public employment, such as in the military and law

34. 50 State Comparison: Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights & Firearm Rights, RESTORATION
RIGHTS PROJECT, http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/chart-1-loss-andrestoration-of-civil-rights-and-firearms-privileges/ [https://perma.cc/2RN9-QV8N] (last updated Aug.
2018). See generally LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY (2004)
(discussing the legal barriers facing individuals following a criminal conviction).
35. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 n.1 (1971); see also PIPPA HOLLOWAY, LIVING
IN INFAMY: FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014);
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 31, at 71; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1045±46.
36. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:29±37; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
   ³[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons´  )UDQNOLQ ( =LPULQJ Firearms and Violence, in 1
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 167, 178±79.
37. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:47±61; see also 0DKOHUY(E\86   ³,W
is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a
SXQLVKPHQW´ . For discussions of the nature of deportation, see Jennifer M. Chacón, Criminalizing
Immigration, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 205, 207; Kari Hong, The
Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2074 (2017); Christopher N.
Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and Criminal
Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2132 (2014); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil–Criminal
Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 350 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Joann Sahl, Can We Forgive Those Who Batter? Proposing an End to the Collateral
Consequences of Civil Domestic Violence Cases, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 527 (2016).
39. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191±92 n.1, 197 (1898).
40. Demleitner, supra note 31, at 154.
41. Id.
42. Philip M. Genty, Family-Related Consequences, in LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:25±28.
OF
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enforcement.43 A criminal record can preclude private employment in a
regulated industry,44 with certain government contractors, or in positions
requiring security clearances.45
&RQYLFWLRQFDQDOVRUHVWULFWRQH¶VDELOLW\WRKROGDJRYHUQPHQWFRQWUDFWWR
obtain government licenses and permits,46 to live in public housing,47 to receive
other benefits, or to collect a vested public pension.48 Those convicted of
certain crimes may lose the right to drive a car.49 Persons convicted of sex
offenses often must register, may be excluded from living in particular areas,

43. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) (restricting enlistment of people with convictions)
(discussed in LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:7); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.13(4) (West 2017)
(prohibiting employment as law enforcement officer of those convicted of felonies and certain
misdemeanors).
44. For example, the court in DiCola v. FDA upheld lifetime debarment from the pharmaceutical
industry based on a criminal conviction:
The permanence of the debarment can be understood, without reference to punitive
intent, as reflecting a congressional judgment that the integrity of the drug industry,
and with it public confidence in that industry, will suffer if those who manufacture
drugs use the services of someone who has committed a felony subversive of FDA
regulation. . . . That judgment may proceed from a skeptical view of the
malleability of individual men and women, . . . or from a greater concern with the
cost of an error visited upon the public than with the cost of an error felt only by
the excluded felon, . . . or more likely from the cumulative force of both
sentiments.
77 F.3d 504, 507±08 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
45. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1800.
46. Id. at 1801; LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:8±16. The Supreme Court upheld a prohibition
on licensing people convicted of crime:
It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the violation of the penal laws
of a State, has some relation to the question of character. It is not, as a rule, the
good people who commit crime. When the legislature declares that whoever has
violated the criminal laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral
character, it is not laying down an arbitrary or fanciful rule²one having no relation
to the subject-matter, but is only appealing to a well-recognized fact of human
experience.
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898).
47. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:17; Ann Cammett, Confronting Race and Collateral
Consequences in Public Housing, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2016); Lahny R. Silva,
Collateral Damage: A Public Housing Consequence of the “War on Drugs,” 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
783, 785 (2015).
48. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:19±21; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343
(Pa. 2012).
49. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:23; see also 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2012) (requiring states to
VXVSHQGGULYHU¶VOLFHQVHVRISHRSOHFRQYLFWHGRIGUXJFULPHVRUHOVHORVHIHGHUDOKLJKZD\IXQGV 

242

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:233

and can be subject to post-incarceration civil commitment.50 Criminal records
are increasingly available to all branches of the government and all segments
of the public through computer databases, thus making collateral consequences
susceptible to ready enforcement,51 although some states provide for limited
access to conviction records.52
At the same time, the legal effects of a conviction are hard to eliminate.
Some collateral consequences, by their terms, apply only for a specified period,
while others are in effect for life. Although all jurisdictions have some method
of eliminating the effects of the conviction, such as pardon, sealing, or
expungement,53 often relief is practically unavailable or is restricted to a narrow
class of convictions or offenders.54
B. The Late Twentieth Century Judicial View: Collateral Consequences are
Non-Criminal
In spite of the prevalence of collateral consequences²or perhaps because
of it²federal constitutional law regulates them minimally. The Supreme Court
has held that occupational ineligibility,55 deportation,56 sex-offender

50. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:38±46; see also WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS
POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49±51
(2009); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Notification, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note *, at 397, 403.
51. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases, and Surveillance, in 2 REFORMING
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE:
POLICING
209,
210,
213
(Erik
Luna
ed.,
2017),
http://academyforjustice.org/volume2/ [https://perma.cc/8XTW-HMFZ]; Alessandro Corda, More
Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 15±16
(2016). See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015). Even juvenile
records are available to the public in some states. Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO.
L.J. 365, 365 (2018).
52. Margaret Love, Restrictions on Access to Criminal Records: A National Survey,
COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
9,
2017),
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/03/09/restrictions-on-access-to-criminal-records-a-nationalsurvey/#more-11938 [https://perma.cc/N7GN-BCGB].
53. Id.; see also 50 State Comparison: Judicial Expungement, Sealing, and Set-aside,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50state-comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/ [https://perma.cc/MTJ8-JUCT] (last
updated Aug. 2018).
54. Love, supra note 52.
55. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 190, 197 (1898).
56. *DOYDQY3UHVV86   ³>:@KDWHYHUPLJKWKDYHEHHQVDLGDWDQHDUOLHU
date for applying the ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it has no
DSSOLFDWLRQWRGHSRUWDWLRQ´ 
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registration,57 and civil commitment58 are not subject to the prohibitions on ex
post facto laws, although some specific registration regimes have been held so
restrictive as to constitute punishment59 or require individualized
determinations.60 The Court has also ruled that people with convictions may
be disenfranchised61 and denied the right to possess firearms.62 Many courts
have held that collateral consequences are not punishment and thus are not
covered by the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments63 or the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.64
While scholars have criticized collateral consequences as
disproportionately falling on people of color,65 courts hold that people with
convictions are not a suspect class under the equal protection doctrine, so
legislation disadvantaging them is permissible if it passes lenient rational-basis
review.66 Lower courts occasionally find particular restrictions irrational;67
however, under the approach of most courts, saving money will almost always
be a satisfactory reason for denying benefits;68 denial of licensure or

57. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104±06 (2003).
58. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
59. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:43.
60. In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2014).
61. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
62. See supra note 36.
63. See, e.g., %\UQHY6HF¶\86'HS¶WRI+RPHODQG6HF)$SS¶[±47 (3d Cir.
2015); People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 43; State v. Meadows, No. A13±1023, 2014 WL 3396238,
at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 14, 2014).
64. See, e.g., Crook v. Galaviz, No. EP±14±CV±193±KC, 2015 WL 502305, at *9 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 2015), aff’d)$SS¶[ WK&LU 5REHUVRQY'LU7'CJ-CID, No. 6:08cv324,
2008 WL 5412383, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2008); Urciuolo v. Commonwealth, 684 A.2d 1094, 1096
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
65. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002); Bernice B. Donald, Effectively
Addressing Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions on Individuals and Communities, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2016, at 1, 1; George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the
Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899±1900 (1999); Michael Pinard, Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
457, 470±71 (2010); see also Cassia Spohn, Race and Sentencing Disparity, in 4 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note *, at 169, 169±71.
66. Talley v. Lane, 13 F.3d 1031, 1034±35 (7th Cir. 1994).
67. %DUOHWWD Y 5LOOLQJ  ) 6XSS G   ' &RQQ   ILQGLQJ ³FDWHJRULFDO
GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQRIDOOSHUVRQVZKRKDYHHYHUEHHQFRQYLFWHGRIDIHORQ\´IRUSUHFLRXVPHWDOs trading
OLFHQVH³LVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO´ 
68. Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363± WK&LU  ³>7@KHFRQVHUYDWLRQRIIXQGV
constitutes a rational basis on which to deny assistance to FRQYLFWHGIHORQVDQGVH[RIIHQGHUV´ 
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employment is justified to protect public safety69 or to promote public
confidence in government70 or a regulated industry.71
In the criminal context, most courts hold that a judge accepting a guilty plea
must warn of the direct consequences, but not of collateral consequences. 72
Similarly, while the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to offer
competent representation, most courts hold that counsel need not advise of
collateral consequences.73
There are two exceptions. First, affirmative misadvice, even about a
collateral consequence, may be incompetent even if there was no obligation to
offer correct advice in the first place.74
The second major exception is the collateral consequence of deportation.
By statute or court rule, many jurisdictions required advice of the possibility of

69. 5LQHKDUWY/RXLVLDQD'HS¶WRI&RUUV1R-5624, 1994 WL 395054, at *1 (5th Cir. July
7, 1994) (stating that an ePSOR\PHQW SURKLELWLRQ ³UDWLRQDOO\ UHODtes to maintaining security and
safety´ 
70. 3DUNHUY/\RQV)G WK&LU  ³,OOLQRLV¶VVWDWHGLQWHUHVWLQEDUULQJIHORQV
IURPHOHFWLYHRIILFHLVWRHQVXUHµSXEOLFFRQILGHQFHin the honesty and integrity of those serving in state
DQGORFDORIILFHV¶3DUNHUdoes not dispute the legitimacy of this interest, nor has he argued that the
VWDWXWHGRHVQRWUDWLRQDOO\IXUWKHULW´  TXRWLQJ People v. Hofer, 843 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ill. Ct. App.
2006)).
71. See DiCola v. FDA, 77 F.3d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
72. State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 682± ,RZD  ³7RDGKHUHWRWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH
Fourteenth Amendment a sentencing court must insure the defendant understands the direct
consequences of the plea including the possible maximum sentence, as well as any mandatory
minimum punishment. However, the court is not required to inform the defendant of all indirect and
FROODWHUDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIDJXLOW\SOHD´  TXRWLQJState v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 1998)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Washington, 37 N.Y.S.3d 867, 870 (Sup.
Ct. 2016  ³>&@ULPLQDOFRXUWVDUHLQQRSRVLWLRQWRDGYLVHGHIHQGDQWVRIDOORIWKHUDPLILFDWLRQVRID
guilty plea that are personal to each defendant. Accordingly, the courts have drawn a distinction
between consequences of which the defendant must be advised, those which are direct, and those of
ZKLFK WKH GHIHQGDQW QHHG QRW EH DGYLVHG FROODWHUDO FRQVHTXHQFHV´ (quoting People v. Ford, 657
N.E.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jenia I. Turner, Plea
Bargaining, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 73, 77±78 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/volume3/ [https://perma.cc/4NCQ-X4ES].
73. State v. LeMere, 2016 WI 41, ¶ 69, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 662, 879 N.W.2d 580, 598±99; see also
Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1160 (2015). See generally Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea
Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901 (2017).
74. State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 538±39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); People v. Dodds,
2014 IL App (1st) 122268, ¶¶ 38±39; see also United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d 34, 51 (1st
Cir. 2016).
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deportation.75 In Padilla v. Kentucky,76 the Supreme Court held that effective
assistance of counsel entitled clients pleading guilty to a warning of the
possibility of deportation.77 Lower courts are now working out the question of
whether defense counsel must advise of other serious collateral consequences,
such as sex-offender registration or incarceration.78
While collateral consequences can be mitigated through pardon and other
forms of legal relief,79 pardon was a much more realistic hope for convicted
persons in the past than it is now.80 Finally, while historically disabilities
applied only in the jurisdiction of conviction,81 a conviction in one jurisdiction
now often has effects nationwide.82 Often a jurisdiction will impose a disability
without regard to whether the jurisdiction of conviction does so.83
75. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 708 (2002).
76. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of collateral
consequences in the context of habeas corpus petitions; the existence of collateral consequences can
prevent mootness where a defendant has been released from custody. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
391 n.4 (1985).
77. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
78. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 4.7. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 60.
79. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, Ch. 7 & $SS¶[ $-10 to A-63; 50 State Comparison:
Characteristics
of
Pardon
Authorities,
RESTORATION
OF
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/50-state-comparisoncharacteristics-ofpardon-authorities/ [https://perma.cc/5US7-DFC6] (last updated June 2018). The Collateral
Consequences Resource Center maintains a comprehensive, updated list of all legal mechanisms for
relief of collateral consequences. State-Specific Resources, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/state-specific-resources/ [https://perma.cc/5BHE-4SJK] (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018).
80. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1181±   ³>,@QPRVW\HDUVEHWZHHQDQGPRUHWKDQKDOIRIWKH
thousands of petitions filed were sent forward to the White House with a favorable official
recommendation. At the White House, the president usually approved cases recommended
favorably . . . DQG VRPHWLPHV ZDV PRUH LQFOLQHG WR OHQLHQF\´  id. at 1192 (noting that during the
administrations of Presidents Kennedy through Carter, pardon grant rates ranged from 30±40%); see
also LOVE ET AL., supra QRWH  DW $SS¶[ $-6 (discussing pardon practices in the states). See
generally Mark Osler, Clemency, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note *, at 419, 429.
81. See Huntington v. Attrill, 186   ³$QGSHUVRQDOGLVDELOLWLHVLPSRVHGE\
the law of a State, as an incident or consequence of a judicial sentence or decree, by way of punishment
of an offender, and not for the benefit of any other person . . . are doubtless strictly penal, and therefore
have no extra-WHUULWRULDORSHUDWLRQ´ 
82. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1)(e) (West 2009) (denying firearms rights to those
convicted in other states).
83. In Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 26 (2007), for example, a defendant with three state
battery convictions was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law; the law in the state of
conviction imposed no such prohibition. See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1 (2016) (defining
³>V@H[XDO RIIHQVH´ WR LQFOXGH ³any federal, military, or out-of-state conviction for any offense that
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Ironically, collateral consequences are more important for relatively less
serious crimes.84 If a person is sentenced to 25 years imprisonment at hard
labor, it likely matters little that she will be ineligible to become a licensed
accountant upon release. Someone convicted of bank fraud cannot expect to
remain in or return to work in a financial institution whether or not she goes to
prison. But a person sentenced to unsupervised probation and a $250 fine for a
minor offense suffers a catastrophic loss if she loses her job or is unable to
teach, care for the elderly, live in public housing, or be a foster parent to a
relative. This is particularly so if no one told her about it in advance or
considered possible alternative plea bargains that could have avoided the
catastrophic consequences. If the requirements of due process are to be
established by looking at the private and governmental interests at stake, and
the risk of an erroneous deprivation,85 there is a strong argument that the
balance has been drawn in the wrong place.
III. THE ORGANIZED BAR RESPONDS: REFORM OF COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
Historically, collateral consequences of criminal conviction were not
particularly important to the legal system because the penalty for felony was
death.86 Conviction of felony resulted in a single major collateral consequence,
FLYLOGHDWKZKLFKZUDSSHGXSDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VOHJDOOLIHDVWKHVWDWHSUHSDUHGWR
end his natural life.87 As prison terms replaced automatic capital punishment,
and therefore most people convicted of crimes ultimately reentered free society,
civil death came to be regarded as too harsh.88 In the mid-twentieth century, it

XQGHUWKHODZVRIWKLV6WDWHZRXOGEHDVH[XDORIIHQVH´ -HIIUH\%.XFN$QQRWDWLRQElections: Effect
of Conviction Under Federal Law, or Law of Another State or Country, on Right to Vote or Hold Public
Office, 39 A.L.R.3d 303, 305, 313±14 (1971).
84. See, e.g., Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal
Protection to Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299, 2313
(2017); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758, 763
(2017); Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 171±72 (2017).
85. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334±35 (1976).
86. Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 351 (1968); see also Margaret
Colgate Love, Starting Over With a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal
Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1714, 1733 (2003). See generally Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse
Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A Comparative Study (Part 2), 59 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 542 (1968).
87. See generally Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note * (describing historical punishment of
³FLYLOGHDWK´ZKLFKIROORZHGIHORQ\FRQYLFWLRQ 
88. Id. at 1797.
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appeared that collateral consequences might fade away as civil death had.89 But
the rise of mass conviction, along with the general increase of government
regulation in society, created a system of collateral consequences.90
In their creation and administration, collateral consequences were not part
of a rational, systematic, careful policy.91 But there is, of course, a substantial
public interest in public safety, which includes the idea that people with
convictions who have the capacity to live law-abiding lives should be
encouraged to do so.92 Starting in the early years of the twenty-first century,
the organized bar responded. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards were
promulgated in 2004,93 WKH 8QLIRUP /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 8QLIRUP &ROODWHUDO
Consequences of Conviction Act in 2010,94 DQGWKH$PHULFDQ/DZ,QVWLWXWH¶V
revised sentencing provisions in 2017.95
A. Collection of Collateral Consequences.
Their basic approaches to the issue shared important similarities. The
ABA, ULC, and ALI agreed that a critical first step in managing collateral
consequences is collecting, publishing, and updating a compendium cataloging
all collateral consequences.96 Congress and state legislatures have made
imposing collateral consequences a central function of the criminal justice
system; it is as if there is a title of the U.S. Code, and the code of every state,
reguODWLQJ ³FRQYLFWHG SHUVRQV´ LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ DV VWDWHV DQG WKH IHGHUDO
JRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWH³HQYLURQPHQWDOODZ´RU³VHFXULWLHV´8QIRUWXQDWHO\ODZV
governing convicted persons are scattered throughout codes and regulations,

89. Id. at 1798.
90. Id. at 1791.
91. See Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Transparency, Legitimacy,
and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL¶Y REV. 123, 156±71, 179 (2016).
92. Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1318 (2017).
93. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10.
94. UCCCA, supra note 11; see also Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society:
Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J.
753, 759 (2011).
95. In 2017, the American Law Institute approved revisions of the sentencing articles of the
Model Penal Code that make imposition of collateral consequences, and relief from them, part of the
sentencing process. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11; see also Margaret Colgate
Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles
of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 250±51.
96. UCCCA, supra note 11, § 4; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § 6x.02(1);
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.1.
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and individuals charged with crimes generally cannot hire lawyers to comb the
laws and produce a compendium containing all relevant provisions.97
Congress agreed that a compilation was a necessary beginning and provided
for the funding of the creation of a compendium in the Court Security
The National Inventory of Collateral
Improvement Act of 2007.98
Consequences of Conviction,99 initially compiled by the ABA and now
maintained by the Council of State Governments, is an important development,
although it is not complete or completely accurate.
In addition, in some jurisdictions, public defenders or others have created
state guides to collateral consequences.100 Often, these guides do not list all
collateral consequences applicable to every crime.101 Instead, they selectively
identify the most serious and common collateral consequences, collateral
consequences applicable to the most common offenses, and collateral
consequences most important to the population typically in the criminal justice
system, that is, those who are relatively less affluent.102 There should be such
guides in every state; again, they should be regularly updated and made
available to all lawyers and judges.103
B. Collateral Consequences In the Plea and Sentence Process
In spite of the importance of collateral consequences to individuals, before
Padilla v. Kentucky,104 most courts held that counsel and the court had no duty
to advise the client about the collateral consequences resulting from the
conviction.105 Padilla¶VKROGLQJWKDWFRXQVHOGLGKDYHDGXW\WRDGYLVHDERXW
the possibility of deportation was important and may portend extensions to
other collateral consequences, perhaps under state constitutional

97. Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 684±85.
98. Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543±
44 (2008).
99. National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUSTICE CTR.: THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV¶TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org [https://perma.cc/AJ5Y-PZHV] (last
visited Oct. 2, 2018).
100. See Compilations & Inventories, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/compilations-inventories-of-collateral-consequences/
[https://perma.cc/9A7L-UE85] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
101. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 687.
102. Id. at 689±90.
103. Id. at 687, 690±91.
104. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
105. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 75, at 699.
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interpretations. 1HYHUWKHOHVV VRPH FRXUWV FRQWLQXH WR KROG WKDW FRXQVHO¶V
responsibility does not extend to collateral consequences beyond deportation.106
The UCCCA,107 ABA Standards,108 and Model Penal Code109 all recognize
the importance of counselling clients about collateral consequences generally.
7KLV VHFWLRQ H[SODLQV ZK\ WKH FOLHQW¶V LQWHUHVWV FDQQRW EH VHUYHG ZLWKRXW
attention to collateral consequences.
1. Plea bargaining and charging negotiations
Counsel can help the client in plea bargaining through knowledge of
collateral consequences. In Padilla, the Supreme Court noted that
informed consideration of possible deportation can only
benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the
plea-bargaining
process.
By
bringing
deportation
consequences into this process, the defense and prosecution
may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the
interests of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode
may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which only a
subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel
who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the
deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may
be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order
to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of
deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that
automatically triggers the removal consequence. At the same
time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with
a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not
mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge
that does.110

106. See State v. LeMere, 2016 WI 41, ¶ 69, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 662, 879 N.W.2d 580, 598±99;
Johnson, supra note 73, at 941; Murray, supra note 74, at 1142.
107. UCCCA, supra note 11, § 5 (requiring notice before guilty plea); id. § 6 (requiring notice
at sentencing and upon release).
108. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.3(a) (requiring notice
before a plea of guilty); id. Standard 19-2.4(b) (requiring notice at sentencing).
109. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § 6x.04(1) (requiring notice at
sentencing).
110. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
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While Padilla addressed deportation, other significant consequences, such
as loss of professional licenses,111 forfeitures,112 and even loss of civil rights,113
can also be bargained over.
Because the subjects of plea agreements are not limited to traditional
criminal punishment, it wRXOG EH DUELWUDU\ WR PLQLPL]H GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V
responsibilities. An effective lawyer can use collateral consequences to
mitigate other aspects of the sentence, or as the Court suggested in Padilla,
bargain toward a conviction with less onerous collateral consequences.
3URVHFXWRUV¶RIILFHVRIWHQFRQVLGHUFROODWHUDOFRQVHTXHQFHVLQWKHLUGHFLVLRQV114
Competent private criminal practitioners, and public defenders in offices
recognizing the impact of collateral consequences, use collateral consequences
in their negotiations.115 This may mean obtaining diversion or pleading to a
crime that avoids a serious collateral consequence, agreeing to a penalty that is
reduced in light of a serious collateral consequence, or of course, obtaining
nothing at all from a prosecutor who considers a plea offer and charge fair and
just as is. But there is no reason that large numbers of clients should act in
ignorance of the legal consequences of their decisions, or that their attorneys
should categorically forgo a consideration which, in some cases, would have
led to a better plea agreement.
2. Sentencing
Under most systems, a judge can impose a sentence from among a range of
possibilities. Sometimes discretion is limited by guidelines or mandatory

111. Ex parte Reed, Nos. WR±50,961±04, WR±50,961±05, 2009 WL 97260, *4 (Tex. Crim.
App. Jan. 14,   GLVFXVVLQJ SOHD EDUJDLQ LQYROYLQJ VXUUHQGHU RI SHDFH RIILFHU¶V OLFHQVH  In re
Meyers, 562 N.Y.S.2d 502, 502±03 (App. Div. 1990) (discussing resignation from bar as part of plea
bargain).
112. Libretti v. Wyoming Attorne\ *HQ  ) $SS¶[   WK &LU   discussing
forfeiture of property as part of plea agreement).
113. City of Baldwin v. Barrett, 458 S.E.2d 619, 621 (Ga. 1995) (discussing a loss of the right
to hold public office).
114. Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245,
250, 266±67 (2016); see also Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775,
775±76 (2016); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1200 (2016);
Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
213, 215, 237 (2016).
115. Caprice R. Jenerson, Considering Collateral Consequences in Your Representation,
CHAMPION, Nov. 2016, at 47, 47±48 ³7KH 1DWLRQDO $VVRFLDWLRQ RI &ULPLQDO 'HIHQVH /DZ\HUV
(NACDL) proposes that the avoidance and mitigation of collateral consequences are integral parts of
WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDQDFFXVHGSHUVRQ´ 
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minimum sentence provisions,116 but it is rare that conviction inexorably leads
to a single lawful penalty.117 Judges choose among lawful sentences by
examining statutory factors118 and general principles of sentencing, which are
broad.119 Because courts can consider almost everything when exercising their
sentencing discretion, they have always had the power to take into
consideration that the defendant would be subject to collateral consequences.
There is some evidence that collateral consequences are moving toward
becoming a more formal sentencing factor.120 The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice provide: ³7KH legislature should authorize the sentencing court to take
into account, and the court should consider, applicable collateral sanctions in
GHWHUPLQLQJDQRIIHQGHU¶VRYHUDOOVHQWHQFH´121 The commentary explains that
³WKHVHQWHQFLQJFRXUWVKRXOGHQVXUHWKDWWKHWRWDOLW\RIWKHSHQDOW\LVQRWXQGXO\
VHYHUHDQGWKDWLWGRHVQRWJLYHULVHWRXQGXHGLVSDULW\´122 The Model Penal
Code also brings collateral consequences into the sentencing process.123
In a highly publicized 2016 decision, United States v. Nesbeth,124 Senior
Judge Frederic Block of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York considered collateral consequences in imposing a sentence:
I have imposed a one-year term of probation. In fixing this
term, I have also considered the collateral consequences Ms.
Nesbeth would have faced with a longer term of probation,
such as the curtailment of her right to vote and the inability to
visit her father and grandmother in Jamaica because of the loss
of her passport during her probationary term. 125

116. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note *, at 95, 97, 99; Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimums, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note * at 117, 119.
117. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1790± ³)RUPDQ\SHRSOHFRQYLFWHGRI
crimes, the most severe and long-lasting effect of conviction is not imprisonment or fine. Rather, it is
being subjected to collateral consequences involving the actual or potential loss of civil rights, parental
ULJKWVSXEOLFEHQHILWVDQGHPSOR\PHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHV´ 
118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D) (West 2010).
119. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244±45, 247 (1949); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick
& Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 162 (2016).
120. For state and federal drug offenses, collateral consequences are at issue in every sentencing.
A little-known federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012), allows sentencing judges to deny federal
benefits to those convicted of possession or distribution offenses.
121. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.4(a).
122. Id. Standard 19-2.4 cmt. at 29.
123. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, §§ 6x.02(2), 6x.04.
124. 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
125. Id. at 194±95.
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Because courts consider other personal circumstances when imposing a
sentence, it is hard to see why they should categorically ignore collateral
consequences provided by law.
C. Relief From Collateral Consequences
The ABA,126 the Model Penal Code,127 and the UCCCA128 all contemplate
means of relieving individual collateral consequences to facilitate
rehabilitation, reentry, and self-support. For example, if all people convicted
of felonies may be excluded from public housing, some mechanism should be
available for a nonviolent offender to live in public housing so long as there is
a realistic basis to believe that it will facilitate self-support and presents no
unreasonable risk to public safety. In addition, all of the groups contemplate
broader relief if rehabilitation is indicated by the passage of time, completion
RIWKHVHQWHQFHDQGWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHFRUG129
The law of most jurisdictions has always provided for executive, legislative,
or judicial relief.130 There is evidence that relief improves employment
outcomes.131 The federal system has no established relief measure other than a

126. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.5(a) (waiver of
individual consequence); id. Standard 19-2.5(c) (relieving all collateral consequences).
127. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § [   ³2UGHU RI 5HOLHI´  id.
§ [ ³&HUWLILFDWHRI5HVWRUDWLRQRI5LJKWV´ 
128. UCCCA, supra note 11, §  ³2UGHURI/LPLWHG5HOLHI´ 
129. UCCCA, supra note 11, §  ³&HUWLILFDWH RI 5HVWRUDWLRQ RI 5LJKWV´  MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § [ ³&HUWLILFDWHRI5HVWRUDWLRQRI5LJKWV´ ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.5(c) (relieving all collateral consequences); see also
Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia: Exit from the Sex Offender Registries, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 219,
 SURSRVLQJWKDW³ODZUHIRUPHIIRUWVVKRXOGEHFKDQQHOHGWRZDUGHQKDQFLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUH[LW
based on law-DELGLQJQHVVULVNRIVH[XDOUHRIIHQVHDQGRWKHUUHOHYDQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´ .
130. Restoration of Rights—National Resources, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/K24N-QPPK] (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018).
131. See Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as
Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL¶Y REV. INTER
ALIA 11, 22 (2016); see also Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal
Record Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 46 (2018)
(suggesting that relief mechanisms improve employment outcomes). But cf. Lucy Gubernick, Note,
Erasing the Mark of Cain—An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Ban-the-Box Legislation on the
Employment Outcomes of People of Color with Criminal Records, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1153, 1200
  ZKLOH ³WKH ILQGLQJV GUDZQ IURP WKH DVVHVVPHQWV RI EDQ-the-box laws have been extremely
positive . . . [n]o evaluation was working with baseline data to demonstrate the climate of ex-offender
hiring locally . . . and few measured changes over time, so it is impossible to determine from the
research alone the impact of the OHJLVODWLRQ´ .
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presidential pardon, a matter that has proved frustrating for some federal
courts.132
D. Eliminating Unnecessary Collateral Consequences
Collateral consequences have developed piecemeal, not systematically.133
Because of the limited judicial review, legislatures have not had to articulate
the reasons for their enactment or evaluate their effectiveness or costs.134 It
seems that collateral consequences are sometimes imposed casually, without
full consideration of how they fit into a system of punishment, reentry,
employment, and protection of the public.135
Bar organizations agree that jurisdictions should refine collateral
consequences and eliminate ones that are unnecessary. The Model Penal Code
proposes that disenfranchisement be prohibited, or limited to the period of
imprisonment, and that jury disqualification be limited to periods of
correctional control.136 The ABA proposes that convicted persons not be
disenfranchised, except during confinement,137 and VKRXOGQRWEHLQHOLJLEOH³WR
SDUWLFLSDWH LQ JRYHUQPHQW SURJUDPV SURYLGLQJ QHFHVVLWLHV RI OLIH´138 or for
³JRYHUQPHQWDO EHQHILWV UHOHYDQW WR VXFFHVVIXO UHHQWU\ LQWR VRFLHW\ VXFK DV
HGXFDWLRQDODQGMREWUDLQLQJSURJUDPV´139
Jurisdictions, equipped with comprehensive collections of collateral
consequences, should ensure they are structured to promote public safety, both
by protecting the public from harmful individuals and by leaving room for
people with convictions to lead law-abiding lives. The connection between the
consequence and the reduction of the risk has often been based not on evidence,
but, rather, on intuition or assumptions based on perceived logic.140
132. For example, in the Eastern District of New York, then-Judge John Gleason concluded that
there was no available mechanism to help these worthy applicants. He expunged the conviction of one
applicant and issued a certificate of rehabilitation to another. Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d
448, 457±58 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Doe v. United States,
168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
133. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 676.
134. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1807±11.
135. Id. at 1831.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § 6x.03.
137. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.6(a).
138. Id. Standard 19-2.6(e).
139. Id. Standard 19-2.6(f).
140. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 497, 499 (2015) (discussing
0F.XQHY/LOH86  ZKLFKKHOGWKDWULVNRIUHFLGLYLVPLV³IULJKWHQLQJDQGKLJK´
³WKHHYLGHQFHIRU>-XVWLFH.HQQHG\¶VLQIOXHQWLDO@FODLPWKDWRIIHQGHUVKDYHKLJKUH-offense rates (and
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Increasingly, however, risk can be measured and evaluated.141 A number of
studies show that the risk of reoffending diminishes with time since criminal
involvement.142 There is also evidence that a provisionally hired employee who
clears a state-mandated criminal background check has a reduced likelihood of
future arrest; that is, not imposing the collateral consequence has a positive
public-safety effect.143 In addition, a recent study suggests that the
disqualifications imposed by statutes do not match up to the decisions that
would be reached based on use of empirical data about criminal records and
reoffending.144 It may well be that individuals can get a fairer shake, and public
safety can be better protected, if decision makers consider empirically reliable
factors such as the time since criminal involvement and evidence of law-abiding
behavior, rather than using categorical bars based on conviction of particular
crimes.
IV. THE SPUR OF LITIGATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Legislatures and courts make the laws, not civic groups, no matter how
distinguished that group may be. Nevertheless, the problems identified by the
ABA, ALI and ULC have also been recognized by courts. Clearly the most
iPSRUWDQWMXGLFLDOGHFLVLRQZDVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJLQPadilla v.
Kentucky, holding that counsel had an obligation to advise noncitizen clients
about the possibility of deportation following a conviction.145 More recently,

the effectiveness of counseling programs in reducing it) was just the unsupported assertion of someone
ZLWKRXWUHVHDUFKH[SHUWLVHZKRPDGHKLVOLYLQJVHOOLQJVXFKFRXQVHOLQJSURJUDPVWRSULVRQV´ 
141. See generally John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note *, at 77.
142. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 328±29 (2009); Shawn D. Bushway, Paul
Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and
Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 52 (2011); Megan C. Kurlychek,
Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Brame, Long-Term Crime Desistence and Recidivism Patterns—
Evidence from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 71, 96 (2012).
143. Megan Denver, Garima Siwach & Shawn D. Bushway, A New Look at the Employment and
Recidivism Relationship Through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174,
196 (2017); see also Megan Denver, Evaluating the Impact of “Old” Criminal Conviction Decision
Guidelines on Subsequent Employment and Arrest Outcomes, 54 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 379, 380
(2017).
144. Garima Siwach, Shawn D. Bushway & Megan Kurlychek, Legal Mandates in Criminal
Background Checks: An Evaluation of Disparate Impact in New York State, 2±3 (June 14, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986384
[https://perma.cc/LPM8-L8DN].
145. 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
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in Packingham v. North Carolina,146 a decision invalidating a prohibition on
VH[RIIHQGHUVDFFHVVLQJWKHLQWHUQHWWKH&RXUWREVHUYHG³2ILPSRUWDQFHWKH
troubling fact that the law imposes severe restrictions on persons who already
have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the
FULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHPLVDOVRQRWDQLVVXHEHIRUHWKH&RXUW´147
Padilla involved deportation, arguably a special case because of the
seriousness of the consequence, and Packingham was dicta, an aside. Yet, since
Padilla there has been a stream of lower court cases invalidating collateral
consequences or their retroactive application. In addition, scholars of collateral
consequences have hammered away at doctrines insulating collateral
consequences from ordinary restraints on criminal law or constitutional review.
A. Due Process Notice
A number of cases bring collateral consequences into the due process notice
regime surrounding plea bargains. Thus, collateral consequences are treated
like prison or other traditional elements of the sentence rather than something
completely distinct from the criminal case. For example, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that defense counsel has a duty to advise a person pleading guilty
that civil commitment may be a consequence.148 The Michigan Supreme Court
held that a person pleading guilty was entitled to rely on the fact that the offense
did not require registration, and therefore registration could not retroactively be

146. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
147. Id. at 1737. In another notable recent decision, Justice Gorsuch was skeptical of the idea
that civil sanctions should be systematically subject to more lenient constitutional review than criminal
ones:
[I]f the severity of the consequences counts when deciding the standard of review,
shouldn't we also take account of the fact that today's civil laws regularly impose
penalties far more severe than those found in many criminal statutes? Ours is a
world filled with more and more civil laws bearing more and more extravagant
punishments. 7RGD\ V ³FLYLO´ SHQDOWLHV LQFOXGH FRQILVFDWRU\ UDWKHU WKDQ
compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be taken, remedies
that strip persons of their professional licenses and livelihoods, and the power to
commit persons against their will indefinitely. Some of these penalties are
routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those associated with misdemeanor
crimes²and often harsher than the punishment for felonies.
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
148. 3HRSOHY+XJKHV,/ ³&RQVHTXHQWO\ZHKROGWKDWGHIHQVHFRXQVHOKDV
a minimal duty to advise a defendant who pleads guilty to a triggering offense subject to the provision
of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act that he will be evaluated for and may risk involuntary
FRPPLWPHQWDIWHUFRPSOHWLQJKLVSULVRQWHUP´ 
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imposed upon him.149 In another vein, the Fourth Circuit held that a North
Carolina statutory prohibition on sex offender presence in places where
children gather was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.150
B. Ex Post Facto
Another group of cases holds that sex offender restrictions were sufficiently
punitive that they constitute ex post facto laws.151 As the Sixth Circuit recently
stated:
SORA [Sex Offender Registration Act] brands registrants as
moral lepers solely on the basis of a prior conviction. It
consigns them to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on the
margins, not only of society, but often, as the record in this case
makes painfully evident, from their own families, with whom,
due to school zone restrictions, they may not even live. It
directly regulates where registrants may go in their daily lives
and compels them to interrupt those lives with great frequency
in order to appear in person before law enforcement to report
even minor changes to their information.152
C. New Constitutional Arguments
In addition to cases, there is also a body of legal scholarship trying to
generate more cases, arguing that in various ways constitutional doctrine should
scrutinize collateral consequences more closely.
1. Proportionality
One line of scholarly criticism of collateral consequences has argued that a
more searching standard of review should apply to collateral consequences.153
149. 3HRSOHY7HPHONRVNL1:G 0LFK  ³%HFDXVHGHIHQGDQWSOHDGHG
guilty on the basis of tKHLQGXFHPHQWSURYLGHGLQ+<7$DVHIIHFWLYHLQ LHEHIRUH625$¶V
effective date), was assigned to HYTA training by the trial judge, and successfully completed his
HYTA training, retroactive application of SORA deprived defendant of the benefits under HYTA to
ZKLFKKHZDVHQWLWOHGDQGWKHUHIRUHYLRODWHGKLVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWWRGXHSURFHVV´ 
150. Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 2016). See generally Maurice Chammah,
Making the Case Against Banishing Sex Offenders, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/10/05/making-the-case-against-banishing-sexoffenders#.Ua2JlXziP [https://perma.cc/8XED-78FZ].
151. Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017). See
also Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1222±23 (Pa. 2017) (finding statute ex post facto and
citing cases from Alaska, Indiana, and Maryland), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018).
152. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705.
153. See Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 301, 301 (2015).
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Sandra Mayson has argued that collateral consequences should not be regarded
as punishment, but instead as preventative risk regulation.154 However, given
the presumtion of liberty and moral agency, the reasonableness of the
regulations should be tested:
[R]eview would require the government to show, at the least,
that the conviction classification was substantially related to an
important government interest. The core benefit would be to
strip CCs of the presumption of constitutionality and require
the defending government to explain the need, in context, for
classifying people for disparate treatment on the basis of past
conviction alone. This approach would expose the tradeoffs
between risk and liberty that CCs make and the judgments
behind them, and provide some oversight. It would allow
courts to both recognize CCs as an alarming form of risk
regulation and also engage in case-by-case adjudication. It
would function as a rough requirement oI ³SURSRUWLRQDOLW\´
between the harm to be avoided and the burden imposed.155
On this approach, broad bans, unlimited in time, would be likely to fail,
while targeted, tailored restrictions would be likely to survive.156
2. Civil Death
I have argued that the susceptibility of convicted persons to lifetime
restriction of their rights amounts to a revival of the ancient punishment of civil
death.157 Civil death was understood to be a punishment historically.158 As a
result, all persons charged with and pleading guilty to a felony or misdemeanor
must be informed by counsel and the court that their rights with respect to
employment, public benefits, licensing, family relationships, and all other areas
subject to legal regulation, perhaps including liberty itself, will always
thereafter be contingent.159
154. Id.
155. Id. at 359.
156. Id. at 359±60; see also Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal
Records, 7 J.L. SOC¶Y 18, 19±20 (2005).
157. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *.
158. Id. at 1816±19.
159. Id. at 1826±30. This article has been considered by courts. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.
&W   6RWRPD\RU-GLVVHQWLQJ  ³(YHQLI\RXDUHLQQRFHQW\RXZLOOQRZMRLQWhe 65
PLOOLRQ $PHULFDQV ZLWK DQ DUUHVW UHFRUG DQG H[SHULHQFH WKH µFLYLO GHDWK¶ RI GLVFULPLQDWLRQ E\
HPSOR\HUVODQGORUGVDQGZKRHYHUHOVHFRQGXFWVDEDFNJURXQGFKHFN´ TXRWLQJChin, The New Civil
Death, supra note *, at 1805)); United States v. Brank, 2018 WL 732704, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018)
5HLQKDUGW -FRQFXUULQJ LQSDUWDQG GLVVHQWLQJ LQ SDUW  ³:H PXVW LQWHUSUHWFULPLQDO VWDWXWHV DQG
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3. Grand Jury Consideration of Misdemeanors
I also argue in a recent paper160 that what makHVDFULPH³LQIDPRXV´IRU
SXUSRVHVRIWKHJUDQGMXU\FODXVHRIWKH)LIWK$PHQGPHQWLVWKHFULPH¶VHIIHFW
on reputation, as measured by such things as collateral consequences.161
Accordingly, if this argument is correct, stigmatizing misdemeanors charged in
federal court, such as those involving drugs, sex offenses, or loss of civil rights,
licenses, or permits, can only be prosecuted based on a grand jury indictment.
4. Attacking the DistinFWLRQEHWZHHQ³&ROODWHUDO&RQVHTXHQFHV´DQG
Punishment
A number of scholars have begun to question the distinction between direct
punishments and collateral consequences, calling into question the entire
regime of special treatment for collateral consequences. Joshua Kaiser
FRQWHQGVWKDWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQV³KDYHGHYHORSHGOargely through circular logic,
tautology, mis-citation of precedent, and bald assertion without any supporting
facts or arguments,´DQGDVDUHVXOW, ZHKDYH³IRUPDOLVWLFGHILQLWLRQDOUXOHVWKDW
are difficult to apply and nonsensical when compared with commonsense
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIµGLUHFW¶DQGµSXQLVKPHQW¶´162
D. The Legislative Response
Subjection of new collateral consequences to ex post facto limitations, and
even holding that a state or federal constitutional provision requires notice of
similar civil statutes, such as immigration laws) narrowly, because we recognize their especially
weighty consHTXHQFHV IRU LQGLYLGXDOV¶ OLYHV Our jurisprudence must take into account both the
severity of criminal penalties themselves and the web of collateral consequences that attend a criminal
conviction²the potential for loss of voting rights; restrictions on movement; difficulty in obtaining
employment, apartment leases, and admission to professional organizations; and, in many cases, the
possibility of deportation to a place that is not now and may never have been home²with all the
anguish and hardship that attends the prospect of permanent separation from family, and the anxiety
RIQRWNQRZLQJDWZKDWPRPHQWWKLVH[SXOVLRQPLJKWRFFXU´ (citing Chin, The New Civil Death, supra
note *, at 1799±1803).
160. Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand Jury Clause, 102
MINN. L. REV. 1911 (2018).
161. Id. at 1914±15.
162. Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It: The Tenuous Line Between “Direct
Punishment” and “Collateral Consequences”, 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 343 (2016); see also, e.g., Raff
Donelson, Cruel and Unusual What? Toward A Unified Definition of Punishment, 9 WASH. U. JUR.
REV. 1, 33 (2016); Zachary Hoskins, Ex-Offender Restrictions, 31 J. APPLIED PHIL. 33, 33 (2014);
John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral Consequences, 19 FEDERALIST
SOC¶Y REV.    ³:KLOHPDQ\>FROODWHUDOFRQVHTXHQFHV@DUHGLUHFWO\WDUJHWHGDWSURPRWLQJ
public safety, many others have a tenuous connection to public safety and appear to be more punitive
LQQDWXUHWKDQUHPHGLDO´ 

2018]

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

259

collateral consequences, by no means completely resolves the problem. As
important as those changes may be in individual cases, they are incremental
with respect to the system as a whole and to the tens of millions of people
validly subject to existing collateral consequences. Even constitutional
limitations do not prevent imposition of collateral consequences once the limits
have been satisfied.163 Courts have no authority to rewrite or invalidate
otherwise constitutional laws in the name of good policy.164 Courts work at the
margins, at best trimming collateral consequences to the extent that they are
unconstitutional, or interpreting laws to avoid constitutional doubts.165
Nevertheless, the court decisions represent an important signal in at least
two dimensions. First, if some collateral consequences are brought into the
criminal justice system²say, by requiring notice of deportation or of sex
offender incarceration²it requires little additional time or effort to mention
other important consequences. Many lawyers are likely to include warning and
counseling as part of their practice even in the absence of a legal requirement,
whether as a matter of good practice, for fear that the legal requirement may be
coming, or both.166
In addition, court decisions have the potential to signal that legislation is
needed (just as legislation may signal to courts that problems worthy of
attention to doctrine may exist). Legislatures seem to share the same concerns
about collateral consequences as courts. Legislation mitigating collateral
consequences is increasing in the states.167 The Collateral Consequences
Resource Center has issued two major reports on state laws dealing with
restoration of rights. The cHQWHU¶VUHSRUWFRYHULQJ±2016, concluded
WKDW³[s]ince 2013, almost every state has taken at least some steps to chip away
DWWKHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVRIDFULPLQDOUHFRUGRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\WRHDUQD
163. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1810±11.
164. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016); United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S.    ³8QGHURXUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNIHGHUDOFRXUWVGRQRWVLW
as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own conceptions of
SUXGHQWSXEOLFSROLF\´ 
165. See People v. Temelkoski, 905 N.W.2d 593, 594 (Mich. 2018); see also Doe v. Cooper, 842
F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 2016); Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 55 (2017); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1222 (Pa. 2017) (finding statute ex post facto
and citing cases from Alaska, Indiana, and Maryland), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018).
166. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 688±90; see also Jenerson, supra note
DW ³[C]ounsel bears a professional and ethical responsibility to advocate for the client during
the adversarial process and investigate the impact of collateral consequences, inform the client and the
court, and mitigate and/or avoid those consequences in plea bargaining and sentencing when
SRVVLEOH´ 
167. See Corda, supra note 52, at 20.
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living, access housing, education and public benefits, and otherwise fully
participate in civil socieW\´168 The cHQWHU¶V  UHSRUW QRWHG WKDW ³>W@KH
national trend toward expanding opportunities for restoration of rights and
status after conviction . . . KDVDFFHOHUDWHGLQ´169
V. CONCLUSION
Collateral consequences have proliferated in state and federal law, creating
a vast network of restrictions on people with convictions. For many people
convicted of crime, the collateral consequences will present the greatest burden.
For decades, the legal system largely ignored collateral consequences. For the
most part, legislatures generated them on an ad hoc basis, courts treated them
as outside the criminal justice system, and the organized bar paid them little
attention. There is no reason to hope that creation of, imposition of,
enforcement, of and relief from collateral consequences will become a
considered and crafted feature of the legal system. If so, society will benefit
from improved public safety, avoidance of unnecessary recidivism, and
reintegration of people with convictions into the community.
If the United States is at a golden moment with respect to collateral
consequences, where important participants in the legal system agree that
reform is desirable, nevertheless we are just at the beginning of that moment.
It will take years until collateral consequences are trimmed to those that are
effective and necessary, relief is regularly available to the deserving, and those
willing to work hard can move beyond their criminal records. For the first time
in some time, however, those things seem like possibilities rather than fantasies.

168. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., supra note 16, at 1.
169. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., SECOND CHANCE REFORMS IN 2017: ROUNDUP
OF NEW EXPUNGEMENT AND RESTORATION LAWS 1 (2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Second-Chance-Reforms-in-2017-CCRC-Dec-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NPP6-U7NJ]; see also Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform?
Recent Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL¶Y REV. 361, 369 (2016).

